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SUMMARY 
In social and psychological research, respondents are often asked to report the frequency of 
a behaviour by checking the appropriate alternative from a list of response categories 
provided to them. Previous research indicated that respondents extract comparison 
information from the range of the response alternatives, assuming that the average 
respondent is represented by values in the middle range of the scale, and that the extremes of 
the scale represent the extremes of the distribution. Extending this line of research, the 
present studies demonstrate that the users of a respondent’s report are also likely to use the 
range of the response alternatives as a frame of reference in evaluating the implications of 
the report. Specifically, subjects are found to draw different conclusions about the 
respondent’s personality (Experiment l ) ,  or the severity of his or her medical condition 
(Experiment 21, from the same absolute frequency report, depending upon the range of the 
response scale on which the frequency was checked. Moreover, experienced medical doctors 
were as likely to be influenced by scale range as first-year medical students, suggesting that 
the phenomenon is of considerable applied importance. Implications for the use of response 
alternatives in psychological research and diagnostic judgement are discussed. 
In psychological testing, as well as in laboratory experiments and survey research, 
respondents are often asked to report the frequency with which they engage in a 
certain beaviour or  make a certain experience. To obtain the desired behavioural 
information, respondents are typically asked to check the appropriate alternative 
from a set of response categories provided to them. The selected alternative is 
assumed to inform the researcher about the respondent’s behaviour. It is frequently 
overlooked, however, that a given set of response alternatives may be far more 
than a simple ‘measurement device’. Rather, it may also constitute a source of 
information for the respondent, because respondents assume that the range of the 
response alternatives reflects the researcher’s knowledge of, or expectations about, 
the distribution of the behaviour in the ‘real world’. Specifically, they assume that 
the average behaviour is represented by response alternatives in the middle range 
of the scale and that the extremes of the scale reflect the extremes of the 
distribution (see Schwarz and Hippler, 1987; Schwarz, 1988, in press for reviews). 
Accordingly, respondents were found to extract comparison information from 
the range of the response alternatives provided to them (Schwarz, Hippler, 
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Deutsch and Strack, 1985; Scharz and Scheuring, 1988). Given the above 
assumptions, checking one from an ordered set of response alternatives may be 
considered as determining one’s own location in a distribution, as the following 
example illustrates. Assume that some respondents are asked to report their 
average daily TV consumption on a scale ranging, in %-hour steps, from ‘up to ‘12 
hour’ to ‘2% hours and more’, while others receive a scale ranging from ‘up to 21/2 
hours’ to ‘4% hours and more’ (see Figure 1 for a similar example). Given an 
average TV consumption of 2 hours in the Federal Republic of Germany, West 
German respondents are likely to check a response category in the upper range of 
the low frequency scale which suggests to them that they watch more TV than is 
‘typical’. In contrast respondents who receive the high frequency range scale are 
likely to check a category in the lower range of that scale, suggesting to them that 
they watch fess TV than is ‘typical’. Accordingly, respondents who were given the 
low frequency scale evaluated TV to be more important in their own life (Schwarz 
et al.,  1985, Experiment l ) ,  and reported lower satisfaction with the variety of 
things they do in their leisure time (Schwarz et al . ,  1985, Experiment 2), than 
respondents who were given the high-frequency scale. 
This and related research (Schwarz and Scheuring, 1988) illustrates that 
respondents use their own location on the scale to determine their location in the 
distribution. Thus, the range of response alternatives serves as a frame of reference 
that may affect respondents’ subsequent judgements, either because respondents 
use the inferred ‘average’ behavioural frequency as a standard of comparison, as 
suggested above, or because they use the frequency range of the response scale to 
anchor subsequent rating scales, as suggested by Ostrom and Upshaw (1968). 
However, the use of scale range as a frame of reference may not be restricted to 
respondents. Rather, the recipient of a respondent’s behavioural report may also 
evaluate this report within the frame of reference suggested by the scale. If so, the 
conclusions drawn by a diagnostician, for example, may not only reflect the 
reported absolute frequency of the behaviour under study, but also the frequency 
range of the scale on which this report was provided. 
The studies reported in the present paper were designed to explore this 
possibility in the domain of personality inferences (Experiment 1) and medical 
diagnosis (Experiment 2). In general, we expect that the recipients of a 
respondent’s behavioural report will use the frequency range of the response scale 
as a frame of reference in evaluating the implications of the reported behaviour. 
Accordingly, they may be likely to draw different conclusions from the same 
behavioural frequency report as a function of the range of the scale on which this 
report is provided. The major goal of the present paper is to provide experimental 
tests of this hypothesis and to elaborate its applied implications. 
However, much as the impact of response alternatives on respondents’ own 
inferences was found to decrease as other relevant information becomes more 
accessible (Schwarz and Bienias, in press), we may expect that the impact of scale 
range on recipients’ inferences decreases as the availability of other relevant 
information increases. Given that a number of different comparison standards may 
be used for any judgement (Schwarz and Scheuring, 1988; Schwarz and Strack, 
in press), the influence of the comparison information provided by the response 
scale should be attenuated when other potentially applicable comparison standards 
are temporarily or chronically highly accessible (Higgins, Strauman and Klein, 
1986). 
This additional hypothesis is tested in two ways. In Experiment 1 the cognitive 
accessibility of subjects’ own behaviour is temporarily increased, and it is assumed 
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that subjects are less likely to use the response alternatives as a frame of reference 
under this condition. Experiment 2 extends this line of reasoning to the applied 
domain of medical decision-making, based on the assumption that relevant 
information is chronically more accessible to experts, who can draw on a rich base 
of experience, than to novices. If so, experienced diagnosticians should be less 
likely to rely on the frame of reference provided by the scale than novices. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 was conducted as a modified replication of a study reported by 
Schwarz et af .  (1985). As described above, subjects of the previous study were 
asked to report their own TV consumption on a high- or a low-frequency response 
scale, and the frequency range of the response alternatives was found to affect 
subsequent comparative judgements. In the present study, subjects were given a 
behavioural report provided by a target person on either a high or a low frequency 
range scale, and were asked to estimate how satisfied the target person is with the 
variety of things she does in her leisure time. 
To provide a test of the hypothesis that the impact of scale range decreases as 
other potentially applicable comparison information becomes more accessible, 
subjects were asked to report their own TV consumption in an open-answer format 
either before or after they evaluated the target’s leisure time satisfaction. These 
manipulations resulted in a 2 (low vs. high frequency range scale) x 2 (high vs. low 
accessibility of own behaviour) factorial between-subjects design. 
It was expected that subjects would estimate the target’s satisfaction with the 
variety of her leisure time activities to be higher when the report was given on the 
high frequency scale, suggesting that the target watches less TV than ‘typical’, than 
when it was given on the low frequency scale, suggesting that the target watches 
more TV than ‘typical’. Moreover, the impact of scale range was expected to 
decrease when other comparison information was easily accessible. Accordingly, 
the impact of scale range was expected to be attenuated when subjects had 
previously reported their own TV consumption, thus increasing the accessibility of 
their own behaviour as a standard of comparison. 
Method 
Fifty-nine students (27 males and 32 females) of the University of Heidelberg, 
Federal Republic of Germany, were recruited individually in a university cafeteria 
for a study on ‘impression formation’, and were randomly assigned to conditions. 
They received a self-administered questionnaire in which a target person reported a 
daily TV consumption of ‘2 to 2% hours’, checked either on the high or the low 
frequency range scale shown in Figure 1. 
In all experimental conditions the target person was described as a 28-year-old 
student. Before receiving the target person’s behavioural report, subjects assigned 
to the ‘high accessibility of own behaviour’ condition reported their own TV 
consumption in an open-answer format. Subsequently, they estimated the target’s 
leisure time satisfaction along an ll-point rating scale, with the end-points labelled 
1 = ‘very dissatisfied’, 11 = ‘very satisfied’. Subjects assigned to the ‘low 
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accessibility of own behaviour’ condition reported their own TV consumption after 
they had estimated the target person’s leisure time satisfaction. 
Low frequency scale High frequency scale 
( ) not at all 
( ) up to YZ hour 
( ) l / ~  to 1 hour 
( ) 1 to 1% hours 
( ) 1% to 2 hours 
(X) 2 to 2% hours 
( ) more than 2% hours 
( ) u p  to 2 hours 
(X) 2 to 2% hours 
( ) 2% to 3 hours 
( 13 to 3% hours 
( ) 3% to 4 hours 
( ) 4 to 4% hours 
( 1 more than 4% hours 
Note. The target person‘s reported TV consumption is marked X. 
Figure 1 .  Response alternatives for daily TV consumption 
Results 
Subjects’ estimates of the target’s satisfaction with her leisure time variety were 
analysed by a 2 (scale range) x 2 (accessibility of own behaviour) x 2 (sex) 
ANOVA. Because no effects of sex emerged (all p > .30), the reported data are 
pooled over this variable. As predicted, this analysis revealed a significant 
interaction effect of scale range and accessibilty of own behaviour, F( 1,55)= 
8.83, p < .004. Specifically, subjects who had not previously reported their own TV 
consumption estimated the target’s leisure time satisfaction to be higher when her 
report was given on the high ( M  = 5.3) rather than the low ( M  = 3.9) frequency 
scale, p < .05, Duncan test. This effect replicates the previously obtained results 
(Schwarz et af., 1985), indicating that the subjects used the frequency range of the 
scale as a frame of reference in making inferences about the target person, as was 
previously shown for respondents themselves. 
In contrast, subjects who had previously reported their own TV consumption 
estimated the target’s satisfaction with the variety of her leisure time activities to be 
higher when she gave her report on the low (M = 6.4) rather than high (M  = 4.5) 
frequency scale, p < .05, Duncan test. This finding apparently contradicts our 
expectation that subjects would use their own behaviour as a standard of 
comparison under these conditions, which should eliminate - rather than reverse 
- the impact of scale range. An analysis of subjects’ own behavioural reports, 
provided in an open-answer format before subjects were exposed to the report of 
the target person, reveals, however, that randomization was not successful under 
these conditions. While subjects who were assigned to the low frequency scale 
condition reported watching TV for an average of 1% hours per day, subjects 
assigned to the high frequency scale condition reported an average of ‘12 hour, p < 
.05, Duncan test. Thus, the pattern of data suggests that subjects who reported 
their own TV consumption may indeed have used their own behaviour rather than 
the comparison information provided by the scale to evaluate the target’s 
satisfaction. This, however, resulted in different judgements due to unexpected 
behavioural differences between both experimental conditions. In line with this 
interpretation of the unexpected result, subjects’ reported own TV consumption is 
positively correlated with their evaluations of the target’s leisure time satisfaction, 
r(30) = .41, p < .02, in these experimental conditions. 
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Discussion 
In summary, the present findings demonstrate that the recipients of a behavioural 
report that is provided on a precoded scale use the range of the response 
alternatives as a frame of reference in making subsequent judgements, at least if 
their attention is not drawn to alternative standards of comparison, such as their 
own behaviour. This finding extends previous research by indicating that the use of 
response alternatives as a frame of reference is not limited to the respondent 
himself or herself, who may have paid particular attention to the response 
alternatives to determine his or her own behavioural frequency. However, the 
impact of scale range is apparently attenuated when other sources of comparison 
information are highly accessible, as was presumably the case when respondents 
were asked to report their own behaviour before they were exposed to information 
about the target person. Unfortunately, the data are not as conclusive as we would 
like on this point, due to the failure in random assignment described above. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The results of Experiment 1 have potentially important applied implications. In 
many areas of clinical research and practice, self-report intsruments are commonly 
used to assess the frequency of patients’ behaviours. An analysis of these scales 
indicates that they use either vague quantifiers, such as ‘rarely’, ‘sometimes’, 
‘frequently’, and so on (e.g. Kassielke and Hansgen, 1982; von Zerssen and 
Koeller, 1975, 1976) or numeric response alternatives (e.g. Fahrenberg, 1975; 
Kury, 1977), such as the ones explored in the present research programme. As a 
large body of research indicates, the use of vague quantifiers is highly problematic 
because respondents’ understanding of terms such as ‘rarely’ or ‘sometimes’ shows 
considerable variation, and different respondents use different terms for the same 
absolute frequency (cf. Pepper, 1981 for a comprehensive review). Accordingly, 
the use of numeric response alternatives has been strongly recommended (cf. 
Pepper, 1981). Some scales follow this recommendation. For example, the best- 
known German symptoms checklist, the ‘Freiburger Beschwerdeliste (FBL)’ 
(Fahrenberg, 1975; Kury, 1977), asks respondents to report the frequency of 78 
symptoms (such as headaches, or lack of energy) by checking numeric response 
alternatives, such as ‘about twice a year’, ‘about twice a month’, and so on. While 
numeric response alternatives avoid the problems associated with vague quantifiers, it 
is conceivable that they elicit response range effects of the type identified in 
Experiment 1. 
To the extent that professional diagnosticians use the same strategies as lay- 
persons, the conclusions that they draw from a behavioural report on a symptoms 
checklist may not only depend on the absolute frequency of the reported behaviour 
but may also reflect the nature of the response scale on which this report was 
provided. Assume, for example, that a patient reports on a symptoms checklist that 
he or she suffers of lack of energy ‘about twice a week’. According to the present 
research, we may assume that a health-care professional will consider this a more 
severe medical condition if reported on a scale that ranges from ‘less than once a 
month’ to ‘more than twice a week’, than if reported on a scale that ranges from 
‘less than twice a week’ to ‘daily’. Accordingly, the health-care professional may 
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also be more likely to recommend that the patient sees a doctor for a detailed 
examination in the former case than in the latter. Such a finding would clearly 
contradict normative models that hold that medical judgements should be based on 
a comparison of the absolute frequency of a symptom with a standard provided by 
medical knowledge and experience, rather than a standard suggested by the scale at 
hand (cf. Elstein, Shulman and Sprafka, 1978). 
While this consideration may be quite discomforting, the findings of Experiment 
1 also suggest that the impact of the frequency range of the symptoms checklist may 
perhaps not  be very pronounced for experienced professionals. To the degree that 
experts can draw upon a wide range of other information that is well-organized and 
highly accessible (cf. Lesgold, 1988; Chi, Glaser and Farr, in press), they may use 
other applicable standards to evaluate the severity of the reported symptoms. If so, 
the hypothesized impact of the response scale may be limited to inexperienced 
novices, for whom the chronic accessibility of alternative standards of comparison 
is low. 
To explore these considerations, we asked practising medical doctors and first- 
year students of medicine to evaluate the severity of several symptom reports that 
were presented to them in the context of high or low frequency scales, resulting in a 
2 (level of expertise) X 2 (frequency range) factorial between subjects design. 
Method 
Subjects 
Sixty-seven experienced medical doctors (32 female, 35 male), employed in 
hospitals at Lund, Kristianstad, Angelholm, and Helsingborg (Sweden), and eighty 
first-year students of medicine at the University of Lund, Sweden (36 female, 40 
male (four subjects did not indicate their sex)) participated in this study, and were 
randomly assigned to conditions. The doctors’ mean age was 36.0 years and their 
average professional experience was 8.5 years. They represented different medical 
specializations, with ‘general medicine’ being the most frequent (31.3 per cent). 
The mean age of the first-year students was 22.8 years. 
Procedure 
Subjects were informed that the study investigated whether a standard health 
survey could be shortened without a decrease in usefulness and reliability. They 
received a questionnaire that presented nine frequency reports of different physical 
symptoms (six target items and three fillers), provided by nine different stimulus 
persons who had ostensibly participated in the health survey. Student subjects 
answered the self-administered questionnaire in a group setting during regular class 
hours, whereas the doctors answered it in  their offices, where it was later picked up 
by the experimenter. Subjects had as much time as they wanted to complete the 
task. 
Frequency range 
For the six target items, the target person’s response was presented in the context 
of either a high or a low frequency response scale, following a between-subjects 
design. That is, each subject was only exposed to reports given either on high or on  
low frequency response scales, thus providing a conservative test of the hypothesis. 
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Each symptom report was attributed to a different fictitious target person, 
described by initials, sex, and age. Because the presented symptoms have different 
objective frequencies, three different response scales were used, as shown in Figure 
2 
Scale A 
0 0 0 0 
less than about once about once about once 
once in in six in four in two 
six months months months months 
Scale B 
0 0 0 0 
less than about once about once about once 
once a a month in two a week 
month weeks 
Scale C 
0 
about about about 
0 
less than 
twice a twice four times six times 
week a week a week a week 
0 0 
0 
about once 
a month 
0 
about twice 
a week 
0 
about once 
every 24 
hours 
0 
more 
often 
0 
more 
often 
0 
more 
often 
Figure 2. Response scales for medical symptom reports 
For two target items (‘stitches in the chest’; ‘vomiting’, attributed to Mr K., 43 
years old; and Mr S. ,  39 years old, respectively), scale A constituted the ‘low’, and 
scale B the ‘high frequency scale’ condition. In both cases the response alternative 
‘about once a month’ had ostensibly been chosen by the target person. For the 
remaining four target items (‘aching loins or back’, attributed to Mr Z., 25 years 
old; ‘lack of energy’, Mrs K.,  41 years old; ‘trouble in falling asleep’, Mr S . ,  59 
years old; ‘lack of concentration’, Mrs B. ,  35 years old), scales B and C represented 
the ‘low’ and ‘high’ conditions, respectively. In these cases the chosen response 
alternative was ‘about twice a week’. 
In addition, three filler items (‘aching joints’; ‘blood in stool’; ‘lack of appetite’) 
were presented, using the same scales but different frequency reports, to decrease 
overall response similarity that may have caused suspicion. 
Dependent variables 
For each item, subjects rated the severity of the symptom along 11-point scales 
(with the end-points labelled 0 = ‘not at all severe’, and 10 = ‘very severe’), and the 
necessity to consult a doctor (with the end-points labelled 0 = ‘not at all necessary to 
consult a doctor’, and 10 = absolutely necessary to consult a doctor’), before they 
moved on to the next item. 
After completion of all ratings they answered an open-ended question about the 
disease(s) and disorder(s) that may have caused the reported symptoms for each of 
the nine stimulus persons. These reports were evaluated by five expert judges, who 
were blind to conditions, as described below. 
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Results 
Symptom evaluation 
The mean ratings pertaining to the six target items are shown in Table 1. The six 
severity ratings provided by each subject, as well as the six consultation 
recommendations, were entered into two separate multivariate 2 (frequency range) 
x 2 (subject’s level of expertise) x 2 (sex of subject) analyses of variance 
(MANOVAs), with the multivariate F-statistic based on Wilk’s lambda. Because 
neither a main, nor an interaction, effect of sex emerged, all F < 1, the data 
presented in Table 1 were pooled over this variable. 
As expected, these analyses revealed main effects of the frequency range of the 
response scale on subjects’ ratings of the severity of the reported symptoms, 
multivariate F(6,128) = 4.52, p < .0005, as well as on their recommendations to see 
a doctor, multivariate F(6,128) = 2.85, p < .02. 
Table 1. Mean severity and consultation necessity ratings as a function of scale range and 
expertise 
Expertise: Doctors Students 
Frequency range of scale: High Low High Low 
1 ‘Aching loins or back’ 3.09 4.72 4.94 5.95 
7 ‘Lack of energy’ 2.30 4.13 2.92 5.35 
A. Rated severity of symptoms 
3 ‘Stitches in the chest’ 4.39 4.50 5.88 6.17 
5 ‘Vomiting’ 4.94 5.38 3.75 4.90 
8 ‘Trouble in falling asleep’ 1.56 2.59 2.53 3.07 
9 ‘Lack of concentration’ 1.73 3.34 2.22 2.98 
B. Rated necessity to consult doctor 
1 ‘Aching loins or back’ 4.48 6.25 6.00 7.07 
3 ‘Stitches in the chest’ 6.33 5.78 6.78 6.58 
5 ‘Vomiting’ 6.24 6.47 4.00 5.23 
7 ‘Lack of energy’ 3.42 4.62 3.06 5.15 
9 ‘Lack of concentration’ 2.00 3.56 1.97 2.95 
8 ‘Trouble in falling asleep’ 2.18 2.75 2.64 2.92 
Note. Range of values is 0 to 10; higher values indicate higher severity and higher necessity to consult a 
doctor. 
Specifically, all symptoms were evaluated as more severe when the same absolute 
frequency report was presented on a low rather than a high frequency response 
scale. Separate univariate analyses indicated that this pattern is reliable at p < .05 
for all symptoms, except ‘stitches in the chest’. Similarly, subjects were significantly 
more likely to recommend the consultation of a doctor when the symptom was 
presented o n  a low rather than a high frequency scale for three (‘aching loins or 
back’, ‘lack of energy’, ‘lack of concentration’) of the six reported symptoms. Thus, 
the same absolute frequency of experiencing a physical symptom was evaluated 
differently depending on the frame of reference provided by the response 
alternatives. 
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In addition, a main effect of subjects’ expertise emerged on both measures; 
multivariate F(6,128) = 6.20 and 3.55, p < .OOS and .01, for severity ratings and 
consultation recommendations, respectively. Specifically, the inexperienced first- 
year students rated five of the six symptoms as significantly more severe, and were 
more likely to recommend the consultation of a doctor in response to three of the 
six symptoms, than the experienced practitioners. This is likely to reflect a risk- 
avoidance strategy of the student subjects: if uncertain about a medical diagnosis 
the safe option is to assume that the symptom is severe and to recommend 
consultation. 
Contrary to expectations, however, no interaction effect of level of expertise and 
frequency range of the scale was obtained for any of the items, all F < 1. Thus, the 
predicted impact of frequency range on subjects’ severity ratings and consultation 
recommendations was independent of their level of expertise. Most importantly, it 
was obtained from experienced practitioners as well as from novices. 
Perceived causes 
After completion of all ratings, subjects had indicated possible underlying causes 
for the targets’ symptoms. It was intended to further analyse the impact of the 
response scale by rank-ordering the perceived causes according to their severity. 
Five independent expert judges (medical doctors), blind to experimental condi- 
tions, who were asked to rank-order the causes along the severity dimension failed 
to do so, because the listed causes were too heterogeneous in themselves or 
represented disorders that may vary considerably in severity (e.g. ‘depression’, 
‘scoliosis’, ‘vertebral compression’). The only classification that seemed practicable 
was a distinction between organic causes on the one hand, and psychological or 
psycho-social causes on the other hand. The first cause that each subject had listed 
was categorized in this way to explore the impact of scale range and professional 
experience on subjects’ most accessible hypotheses about the underlying causes. 
The proportion of psychologicaVpsycho-social causes was analysed for each item 
as a function of frequency range of the response alternatives and subjects’ level of 
expertise, using a procedure described by Rosenthal and Rosnow (1985, pp. 47 ff.). 
The relevant percentages are shown in Table 2. Interestingly, the first causal 
hypothesis put forward by experienced practitioners for each symptom report was 
not affected by scale range for any of the symptoms, all p > .15, whereas the 
students’ hypotheses differed as a function of scale range for three of the six 
symptoms. The students listed a significantly greater number of psychological 
causes for ‘stitches in the chest’, ‘vomiting’, and ‘lack of concentration’, when the 
symptom was reported on a high rather than a low frequency range scale, z = 2.72, 
2.59, and 3.52, respectively, p’s <.01. That is, the likelihood that a psychological 
cause was assumed increased as the perceived severity of the symptom decreased. 
This result may reflect a subjective theory held by the student subjects, that 
presumably light symptoms are more likely to be psychologically caused, whereas 
presumably severe symptoms are more likely to have an organic origin. Thus, an 
inference may be made from the perceived severity of a symptom to its underlying 
cause, resulting in an impact of scale range on  the hypothesized causes that is 
mediated by its impact on perceived severity. The practitioners, on the other hand, 
may have learned from experience that severity is not a valid indicator of causation. 
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Table 2.  Percentage of psychological or psycho-social causes and focused comparisons 
between scale conditions 
Expertise: Doctors Students 
Frequency range of scale: High Low High Low 
1 ‘Aching loins or back’ 
YO 
z 
3 ‘Stitches in the chest’ 
% 
5 ‘Vomiting’ 
Yo 
z 
L 
7 ‘Lack of energy’ 
Yo 
z 
8 ‘Trouble i n  falling asleep’ 
Y O  
z 
9 ‘Lack of concentration’ 
YO 
L 
13 17 
-0.57 
31 19 
1.04 
29 28 
0.15 
31 27 
0.35 
100 100 
0.50 
66 54 
0.93 
51 65 
- 1.25 
17 0 
2.72* 
47 19 
2.59* 
53 39 
1.18 
72 85 
-1.24 
73 34 
3.52* 
Note: Percentages are given in the first row of each entry, and z-scores in the second; z-scores with an 
asterisk indicate a significant difference at the .OOS level, one-tailed. All other p > .lo. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 indicate that the use of response alternatives as a 
frame of reference is not restricted to lay-persons. Rather, professional users of a 
behavioural frequency report were also found to be influenced by the frequency 
range of the scale on which the report was provided in evaluating its implications. 
For example, experienced physicians as well as first-year students of medicine 
evaluated vomiting once a month as indicating a more severe medical condition, 
and were more likely to recommend consultation, when it was reported on a scale 
ranging from ‘less than once in six months’ to ‘more often than once a month’, than 
when it was reported on a scale ranging from ‘less than once a month’ to ‘more than 
twice a week’. 
Contrary to expectations, experienced physicians were found to rely on the 
implicit standards communicated by the response alternatives to the same degree as 
inexperienced novices. This finding suggests that it may not be sufficient to have 
relevant knowledge stored ‘somewhere’ in long-term memory. Rather, it may be 
necessary that this knowledge is highly accessible at the time of judgement to 
attenuate the impact of the resposne scale, as was suggested by Experiment 1. In 
fairness to our expert subjects, we have to add, however, that the only relevant 
information they had about each fictitious patient was a frequency report 
pertaining to one single symptom. It seems likely that the impact of this piece of 
information would be less pronounced if presented in the context of additional 
medical information, allowing the application of medical kowledge pertaining to 
symptom configurations (e.g. Lesgold et al., in press). Moreover, it is conceivable 
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that the doctors would be less affected by the range of the response alternatives if 
they used the symptoms checklist routinely in their practice, thus acquiring 
considerable knowledge about the distribution of responses on the scale. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present findings, in combination with previous research (see Schwarz, 1988, in 
press; Schwarz and Hippler, 1987, for reviews) suggest that researchers and 
diagnosticians who use numeric response alternatives to obtain behavioural 
information from respondents should be aware of the potential impact of the 
information provided by the range of the response scale, at the level of data 
collection as well as interpretation. 
At the level of data collection the frequency range of the response alternatives 
has been found to influence respondents’ behavioural reports, in particular if the 
behaviour is frequent and mundane (Schwarz el al. ,  1985; Schwarz and Bienias, in 
press). Because respondents are unlikely to have detailed episodic memories of 
mundane behaviours (see Bradburn, Rips and Shevell, 1987; Strube, 1987; 
Schwarz, in press, for reviews), they have to use estimation strategies to determine 
behavioural frequencies. In doing so they are likely to use the frequency range of 
the response alternatives as a salient frame of reference, resulting in higher 
behavioural reports on high rather than low frequency scales. This effect is the 
more pronounced, the less relevant episodic information is easily available in 
memory (Schwarz and Bienias, in press). 
If the behaviour under study is ill-defined, as is frequently the case when 
subjective experiences are assessed, the frequency range of te scale is also likely to 
influence respondents’ definition of the target behaviour (Schwarz, Strack, Miiller 
and Chassein, 1988). For example, respondents who were asked how frequently 
they feel ‘really irritated’ assumed more severe cases of irritation to be the target of 
the question when presented a low rather than a high frequency response scale. 
Apparently, they used their knowledge about the relative frequency of mild and 
severe irritations, in combination with the response scale provided to them, to 
determine the meaning of the question. 
At the level of data interpretation the users of a respondent’s report should be 
aware of the potential impact of scale range on their own conclusions. AS 
Experiment 2 indicated, even experienced experts seem to be highly susceptible to 
the impact of the response alternatives, and seem to use them as a frame of 
reference in making diagnostic judgements. While this reliance on the scale at hand 
may be adequate if the scale is carefully tailored to reflect the diagnostically 
relevant frequencies, the current findings suggest that a consideration of the scale’s 
adequacy may not be part of the routine procedure used. Accordingly, the resulting 
decisions may, in part, be based on fortuitous standards that are highly accessible at 
the time of judgement, rather than on sound knowledge and experience. 
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